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THE STATE REGULATION OF THE ISSUE OE CORPORATION SECURITIES.
CHAPTER I.
It has become an accepted principle with us that
politico-economic development tends more and more away from
a condition of laissez-faire to that of an expanding governmental
control. In recent years the most significant phase of the
movement has been the growth in the number and power of regulatory
commissions, state and national. They have passed through the
recommendatory to the mandatory stage with respect to rates,
service, accounts, and lastly capital issues, the subject of our
investigation here.
To trace the development of the exercise of state
supervision over securities issues is largely to set down the
enactments of state legislatures and the decisions of the courts
and commissions. The whole problem is so new and so complex and
we have gone such a very little way towards its final solution,
that we must be always mindful of the fact that the whole field
is yet in transitional stage of development, where laws and
theories of today may be rendered obsolete or impossible of
operation tomorrow, by certain hitherto unforeseen results of
their application.
State control of the issue of corporation securities
in anything resembling the form in which we now see it was first
exercised by Massachusetts as early as 1894. The first restric-
tive law of this kind was one prohibiting stock-watering and was
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enacted in 1871. It is noticeable that excessive capitalization
had been less frequent and capitalistic abuses less flagrant in
Massachusetts than in other states while her corporation laws
had been from the first more strict in form and administration
than had those of any other state. Even in Massachusetts the
practice of nearly all companies amounted virtually to a denial
of any moral or legal right of a government to exercise any
authority over them. This attitude persisted until after the
Civil War but since then it has been firmly replaced by the idea
that state supervision is a legitimate and enforceable preroga-
tive of the legislature.
Prior to the use of capital stock on a large scale,
there had been no real need for any restrictive measures placed
on the nature of industrial borrowing. It has always been deemed
an incidental power of a corporation to borrow or to acquire
property on credit, and any provisions in the charters of
incorporation upon this subject were univerally regarded as so
much surplusage. But it soon became obvious that some limita-
tions upon the borrowing powers were desirable. Accordingly we
find in some early charters clauses limiting the amount borrow-
able to certain proportions of the amount of the paid in capital.
The incorporation laws of some of the states fixed the highest
amount of indebtedness which a concern might assume. These
restrictions however were but the mftre beginnings of a mass of
legislation upon the subject and can hardly be said to have been
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imposed to combat the same evils we have to deal with today.
The common law that stock should be issued only for money, labor,
or property, has long been enforced by the courts and as early
as 1858 we find a clause to this effect in the California
Constitution. In 1874 a similar provision became part of the
organic laws of Illinois and Arkansas, and its adoption, in
practically the same form followed in several other states.
Parallel with the increasing issue of securities and the rise of
corporations, there developed an enormous volume of judicial
decisions and precedents in the matter of the legality and equity
of stock and bond issues. Indeed it is from judicial decrees,
both state and federal, that we have derived most of our state
laws with respect to corporate issues. But an attempt to trace
the growth of the general body of this interesting phase of
corporation law would clearly lead us beyond the range of this
paper.
Massachusetts naturally claims our attention first
since it was the first to apply closely any restrictive measures
on capitalization and to do so, through the agency of a
commission. As was stated before, Massachusetts has always been
circumspect in this matter but loopholes nevertheless abounded
and the advantage taken of the fact led but to closer restric-
tion. Irregularities in gas companies, which had always been a
source of trouble for the Bay State regulative bodies, determined
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their earliest legislation dealing with this problem of over-
capitalization. The Addicks ring obtained control of Boston gas
in 1884 and the price to consumers rose steadily until 1893 when
a rival company was formed through political machinations although
in violation of the Addicks franchise. The new company was able
to sunply gas at a much lower figure than the existant charge.
Suspicion was aroused which lead to an investigation by the iias
and Electric Commission and |4, 500, 000. of water in the form of
bonds were squeezed out of the Addicks concern. The results of
this investigation and subsequent agitation alarmed the people,
and the legislature in accord with popular sentiment, and wisely
too, determined to make such fraudulent issues impossible in the
future. The legislative result was the passage of two bills in
1894 known as the Anti-stock Watering Acts. The substance of
the new laws was that hereafter it would be illegal for any gas
company to issue any stocks or bonds for any purposes except upon
conditions and for the purposes approved by the commission after
a public hearing. Professor John H. Gray, in commenting upon
these laws said that, "While there are grave dangers in these acts,
they are probably, taken all in all, the most effective acts
ever passed in this country to check corporate abuses." To make
the law more effectual the commission was given the full right
of inspection over all corporations doing a similar business in
the state. This form of legislation however was peculiarly
adapted to the situation as it then existed in Massachusetts, for
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already a Gas and Electric Commission had been excercising a
general service supervision and was well prepared to assume the
added duties of regulating the issue of securities. With
Massachusetts securities regulation was more a matter of evolution
than of a radical innovation as it was in some of the other states.
At about the same time Texas enacted a drastic law
giving the State Railroad Commission power to regulate the issue
of railway securities. The circumstances leading up to its
adoption were different from those operative in Massachusetts
however. The Commission had been established in 1891 and launched
immediately upon a vigorous policy of rate regulation. Not long
after the Farmers Loan and Trust Company of Baltimore obtained an
injunction suspending the commissions' rate orders on the grounds
that the rates were not high enough to even pay the expenses of
operation and leave enough for interest on the outstanding bonds.
In the following year the gubernatorial campaign was fought out
mainly on the issue of the regulation of securities. At this
time the railways of Texas had outstanding against them
$455,250,000. or more than one half the assessed valuation of all
the property within the state. One road which had just sold for
#9,500. a mile was immediately mortgaged for $35,000. a mile,
without any improvements whatever. The roads were assessed for
taxation at $63,000,000. yet their stocks and bonds amounted to
$392,000,000. above that figure. After a very bitter struggle
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the pro-regulation candidate. Gov. Hogg, was re-elected and the
present stock and bond law placed upon the statute books. This
act provides for a commission valuation of the roads and declares
null and void any mortgage or lien in excess of this value. In
no case may the combined outstanding indebtedness exceed 150$ of
the value placed upon the properties by the commission. While
differing in form from the Massachusetts law, the Texas stock and
bond law accomplishes practically the same thing - the restriction
of overcapitalization through a state commission. It should be
noted, however, that the Massachusetts law arose out of ir-
regularities in public utilities management, while that in Texas
was enacted to deal with the railroad situation; the one came
out of popular agitation against excessive service charges while
the other was immediately due to the demand for an adequate
return upon capital investments. Thus twenty years ago we have
the beginnings of the movement toward an ever expanding regulatory
power of the state commissions. No extensive theories have yet
been developed by practice and no monumental precedent were
available for the guidance of these bodies. The fundamental
principle, however, which Governor Kogg of Texas formulated in
1892 remains the same today as then, that "The traffic rates of
this country must be maintained to pay the interest on all the
railway's bonds, issued in pursuance with and within the limits
of the constitution directly shall be permitted. Fictitious
bonds are not capital nor the representation of capital. They
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are the fruits of crime".
In a word then corporate abuses were the causes of
the assumption of this prescriptive power by the states and the
chief purpose of the enabling laws was to eradicate the existing
evils and their recurrence in the future. In the cases of both
Massachusetts and Texas watered stock of both railroads and
public utilities had given rise to the generally concomitant
evils; unwarrantably high prices for services as in Massachusetts
and in Texas, both high rates and inability to raise more capital
for legitimate needs of the community. And today, as then, the
chief aim of commission control of securities is the prevention
of overcapitalization. This involves, however, more than
prohibiting the issue of what is commonly known as watered stock -
that which is fictitiously and willfully created - but the
prohibition of the issue of securities for purposes or property
which the government does not hold to have the value of the amount
named in the proposed issue, although there may be no malicious
intent on the part of the corporation.
With the dangers of watered stock we are all familiar,
but the more constructive side of the prevention of overcapitali-
zation has only recently come to be an avowed purpose of
securities control. In almost all cases of increase of a corpo-
ration's funded debt its future borrowing power is weakened, and
it should be a prime consideration with commissions whether or
not a proposed capital increase will not unwarrantably diminish
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both the available supply of capital and the borrowing power of
the petitioner. Thus it really becomes a matter of conservation
of capital and the guiding principle should be to allow an
increase to such an amount and at such time as will best serve the
interests of society. The body which can efficiently administer
the law with this in view will perform an invaluable service to
the investing public and the corporation itself by holding it in
check.
And this brings us to the fourth purpose of this form
of control - the safeguarding of investors interests. As the
result to the consuming public of overcapitalization or economic-
ally unjustifiable extension of credit is evidenced in the form
of higher prices, so to the investor it means failure to secure
the legitimately expected dividends, or worse, loss of the original
investment. If through publicity and the results of investigation
fictitious securities are not to be issued ^ fake promotions of
necessity collapse, and the investor can be assured that his
certificates represent actual capital which is normally productive,
constituting therein a distinct gain to society.
Intimately associated with overcapitalization and
weakened borrowing power is the breakdown of the service which
cannot be built up until new capital can be attracted to the
enterprise. And the more water there is in the stock the more
difficult it is to secure this necessary capital. These then are
the chief purposes of the regulation of the issue of corporate
J
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securities; TTie prevention of overcapitalization which is
generally followed by an unjust raising of prices and weakening
of service, the prevention of unjustifiable absorption of capital
which weakens unnecessarily the borrowing power of the corporation
and reduces the social effectiveness of that capital, the
of service, and fourthly the protection of the investing public
by giving them reasonable assurance that their investments of
money represent actual capital.
After the enactment of the Texas and Massachusetts laws,
both before 1895, nothing further was done until in 1906 when
New York passed a law dealing with this phase of corporation
control. There were however amendments to the Massachusetts laws
passed in 1903 amplifying the powers of the commission and
extending their range. Prom 1907 down to the present we have
witnessed the adoption of commission control of securities issue
in many more states until this feature is embodied in the corpora
tion laws of more than thirty states.
In many of these states corporation abuses were not
widely prevalent but the aim of the legislators was to prevent
their occurrence at some future time if not to clear them away.
The ruling motive of the later laws has been the same as that
which inspired the enactment of the laws of Massachusetts and
Texas. Kence we should reasonably expect to find, as in fact, we
do substantially, the same type of laws in many of the states
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which provide for commission regulation of securities. There are
of course various modifications as to procedure, jurisdiction,
and extent of application, due largely to differences in the
stage of economic development and in the population.
CHAPTER IT.
Now having before us the purpose of securities control
and with a typical regulative law in mind it is our purpose here
to examine in a critical and expository manner the state
supervision of securities with respect to three phases of their
issue, namely, the increase of capitalization without a change
in the corporate form, capitalization with respect to reorganiza-
tions, and lastly with respect to consolidations.
In almost all the states the laws prescribing the
issue of securities of newly formed companies are substantially
the same. In Massachusetts there are two commissions, one
supervising gas and electric industries, the other, the railroads
and other public utilities, however, practically the same
stipulations are embodied in the laws on both classes of securities.
In Arizona and California the commissions may permit issues for
more than the amount authorized by the corporation charter it-
self. It is not clear just why such a feature should have been
added unless it was done to avoid the necessity of having to
pass upon the validity of an issue in the future which was based
upon the property then appraised. However, there is no danger
in such a provision as commissions are generally thought to hold
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down the capitalization figures as low as possible. Prior to the
issue of any evidence of indebtedness by a corporation it must
comply with all the provisions of the laws to which it is subject,
and it must further secure the approval of the commission which
can make whatever inquiries it chooses and can appraise the
property under consideration. In Wisconsin the commission is
not only empowered to do so but it is compelled to make an
appraisal before authorizing an issue. This body must be
satisfied that the purposes to which the proceeds of the proposed
issue are to be applied are legitimate and that they will require
the amount named in the petition. A few states require the
companies to furnish evidence to the commission that the receipts
from the sale of securities have been used in accord with the
terms of the request.
One of the most important points in regard to the
financing of new companies is the prohibition of the capitaliza-
tion of franchises. These provisions generally apply only to
public utilities although railroad companies are included in
some states. Of course if it can be shown that some considera-
tion for the franchise has been paid into a public treasury, that
amount is allowed to be represented in the capitalization. It
can generally be observed that the granting of permission to
issue certificates is a discretionary matter with the state
commissions after thorough investigation and that franchises are
erf* lot
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not to be capitalized.
But during the existence of state commissions there
has arisen a considerable amount of regulation on an extra-
statuory basis, a basis rooted in the previous decisions of
commissions and in the theories developed from time to time, and
with respect to practically every phase of capitalization.
However, surveying this whole field we find that the chief
principles have been laid down in the matter of increase of
capital stock or of funded debt, in reorganizations and in
consolidations. There have been practically no large public
service corporations formed since the passage of the securities
control acts, due to the fact that this department of industry
was already well advanced and that most recent formations are
but the outgrowth of consolidations or reorganizations of
previously existing units.
We will first examine the straightforward increase of
corporate capitalization as it has been affected by state
regulation, which will also cover the matter of capitalization
of absolutely new corporations whose organization comes under
the public service laws of the various states. As the laws
prescribe with respect to capital issues in general only there
are practically no legislative formulas on the subject of
increases but only the adopted principles of the administrative
bodies, some have their policies rather than the laws to discover.
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In July 1911 the Long Acre Light and Power Company made
application to the first district Commission of New York1 for
authority to issue #10,000,000 of preferred stock and #50, 000, 000
of general mortgage honds, #12,000,000 of which were to he issued
at that time. As this was a new concern the case involved the
determination of certain principles which should guide the
commission in fixing an amount necessary for the construction of
a initial plant and for putting it in operating order.
After a thorough investigation the commission came to
the conclusion that the distribution of current might begin if
about $4,600,000 were expended for physical property and about
#900,000 for overhead charges and floating liabilities which did
not represent any physical property. It was evident to the
commission that the entire fund would not be needed at once and
it was further held "That the commission naturally takes the
position that securities may now be issued only to the extent
necessary to construct the initial plant and that it would be
manifestly unwise to authorize the issuance of securities, the
proceeds of which were not to be expended for a considerable
time." The grounds upon which the commission reached this
decision were that in issuing bonds the company would be paying
interest upon money it was not using resulting in a considerable
loss. Having decided to permit the issue of securities the
1. II, 1st. N. Y. P.S.C. 593.
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fundamental question in such cases becomes, how should the capi-
talization be distributed between stocks and bonds.
We find that in previous cases this commission has taken
the position that bonds having foreclosure rights should not
be authorized unless there was reasonable certainty that the
interest would be paid and that it would not be necessary to sell
the property with a resulting loss to the bondholders. The wisdom
of such a rule is obvious for this is in effect to make the
commission a safeguard for the interests of investors.
In was then for the commission to learn what would be
the net profit available for interest. The engineer of the Long
Acre Company estimated the output for the first year would be
36,000,000 kilowatt hours, but the commission comparing this
with the business of the New York Edison Company serving the same
district stated that this was an unwarrantable assumption and
that the Long Acre Company would do well to sell 20,000,000
kilowatt hours the first year. The petitioners said that they
would secure a large average return than the existing companies
because they did not expect to have some of the unfavorable
business the Edison Company was then carrying. To this the
commission replied that they were obliged by them to supply any
and all who desired their services upon equal terms. It was
admitted by the petitioner that it was doubtful whether at the
beginning they would be able to supply electricity at as low a.
rate as the Edison Company, for the plant would be small at first
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and the expenses per unit of output would be relatively high.
In the end the commission decided that the net profit would be
between one cent and one and one-half cents per kilowatt hour,
or between $200,000 and $300,000 gross. If bonds were issued at
five per cent as the petition stated, this would carry an issue
of from $4,000,000 to $5,000,000. In the order this very
significant declaration was made; "Obviously, an approval of
this amount by the commission does not carry with it any
assurance that the interest will be earned. Whether the company
will be successful depends upon the character of the management."
The commission then having decided the capital
requirements to be nearly $6,000,000 and that a bond issue of
from $4,000,000 to $5,000,000 was possible came to the conclusion
that the uncertainties of the case did not warrant an issue of
over $4,000,000. This then made it necessary to issue about
$2,000,000 of stock and the ratio of stock to bonds would thus
be one to two. This is in fact very much more liberal than
that allowed in many states and countries. 1 In Great Britain
the debt issue is generally less than 50$ of the total capitali-
zation, and in Prance it is about one-half for railroad companies.
It is manifest that the more money the stockholders contribute
the greater the possibility that the bondholders will receive
their interest. There is another pressing consideration which the
1. II, 1st. N. Y. P.S.G. 603.
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the Massachusetts commission touched upon when it said, "Obviously,
the lower capital charges may be kept, the lower may be the rates"
It is generally held by commissions that the ratio of
bonds to stock should be kept as low as possible for it appears
to be essential for the credit of any bond issue that the amount
of money invested by the stockholders should be sufficient to
guarantee that the judgment of a number of commercially competent
men was that the enterprise would succeed. It ought to be
demonstrable that a proposed corporation will earn more than its
fixed charge. This view is that held by the Wisconsin Commission.
The general rule is that the bond issue should not exceed 75$ of
the amount of the stock issue; but of course circumstances would
doubtless render neoessary occasional variations from this
principle. This is the upshot of the common law theory that
stockholders are responsible for the enterprise.
The question of the guarantee of the earning power of
the authorized securities is closely linked with the problem just
discussed. Commissions are not responsible either morally or
legally unless specifically stated by law, for returns upon
authorized securities. However, it would be derelict in its duty
if it permitted a bond issue which it had reason to expect would
not pay legitimate earnings.
Yet we are here brought face to face with the United
1. II, 1st K. Y. P.S.C. 603.
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States Supreme Court decision in the Consolidated Gas case, handed
down in 1907. The Consolidated Gas Company had gained permission
in 1884 to issue whatever capitalization it saw fit thus indirectly
obtaining states authorization for its acts. In 1907 the people
of New York sought lower gas rates urging that $8,000,000 of the
gas company's capital represented a franchise which could not
lawfully be capitalized. The court held however that the indirect-
ly authorized issue could not then be rendered void and that the
company was entitled to a fair return thereon. Thus it appears
that issues so authorized may have a legal claim to interest
regardless of the conditions. We can easily see that this might
lead to serious developments for a community which at one time
was able to support a $100,000 corporation might later find it
difficult or even confiscatory to support one of |50,000. This
reflects directly and with full force upon the rates to be charged
for service and it is of the utmost importance to the public.
Furthermore there is another concomitant evil. From now on the
greater proportion of capital issues have to be made upon the top
of former capitalizations which often exceed the real value of
the plants, since these new issues cannot be withheld without
seriously interfering with, or halting the conduct of business,
and on the other hand, since the interest must be paid we are in
a truly precarious state with regard to this matter.
In many applications to commissions past expenditures
for improvements and extensions are urged as sound bases for
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permi8sion to increase capitalization. This is a question of
vital importance, both to the utilities and the patronizing
public. Let us see how the 1st Dist. Com. of N. Y. has dealt
with this problem.
In the matter of the second reorganization of the 1
3rd Av. R. R. Co. it was set forth by the petitioner that there
had been expended upon the corporate property and assets an
amount substantially in excess of the proposed capitalization;
and furthermore, that the estimated cost of reproduction would
bear a "fair and reasonable relation to the securities which
would be outstanding in the hands of the public". As a matter of
fact the evidence did not show that the company had spent upon its
property an amount equal to the capitalization of the new company,
but in rendering the decision the Commission assumed that it had
and said that the mere fact of expenditure of money does not
justify a capital increase. In fact past expenditures are not
sufficient to establish either past or present values. It is
perfectly evident that a mistake in judgment may be made, that a
property may deteriorate, or that progress in the arts may render
it valueless. The issue is well stated2 in these words from the
Commission's decision:
1. II, 1st N. Y. P.S.C. 347.
2. II, 1st. I. Y. P.S.C. 391.
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"To assert that because a company at one time put more
money into a N property which has become worthless, worn out and
obsolete, a successor company which purchases that property at a
foreclosure sale should be allowed to capitalize for the amount
originally expended is so absurd as not to require further
discussion." The commission believes the proposition to be sound
that capitalization should have a direct relation to value. At
the time of the proceedings the 3rd Av. Co. held $225,000 of
Tarrytown Co. stock which was admitted to be worthless and the
stock of the 4th Av. Co. was about to be cut off by foreclosure
and it represented an investment of $2,000,000. While the facts
of investment in such a case are undisputed it is seriously oppose
to the best public policy to allow them to be capitalized and
we may be certain that no state commission would permit such
action.
Two important matters relative to the issue of bonds
which deserve attention at this point are depreciation and
amortization. The law in most states is that dividends cannot
be created out of capital. How if a company does not reserve a
sufficient portion of its revenues to replace capital consumed
during operation, but converts it all into dividends and interest
at the same time requiring further capital to make replacements
we have a situation in which dividends are practically declared
out of capital. The New York 1st Dist. Commission is of the
opinion that in such cases it is not sufficient to provide for
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the replacement of parts but for the replacement of whole plants.
This body generally fixes the specific percentage of the
operating revenue of a concern which shall be sequestered for the
depreciation fund. This is obviously no place for a general
discussion of the depreciation problem but it is an accepted rule
that the replacement of plant and equipment of public service
companies should be provided for out of earnings. Otherwise the
wear and tear will eat up the investors interest in a few years
and rehabilitation made possible only through a large capital
issue taxing still further the earning power of the utility.
It follows in the same manner, that replacements made from
earnings should not be capitalized for it would then subject the
company to the added responsibility of yielding greater returns
upon a property of no greater value or strength than it possessed
originally. In such cases it is but natural for the utility to
at least attempt to raise its charges thus so far shifting the
burden of the increased capitalization to the public.
There is however a "twilight zone" between pure
replacements and betterments or additions. Some improvements
are properly chargeable to capital while others are not.
The Hew Hampshire statutes require all utilities to
oarry adequate depreciation accounts if so ordered by the
commission and prohibit the payment of dividends except out of a
1. Ill, 1st N. Y. P.S.C. 132
J
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net corporate income after setting aside such depreciation reserve.
The New Hampshire Commission has given careful consideration to
this question and in the case of Laconia Gas and Electric Light Co.
it went on record as strongly insisting upon the reservation,
out of earnings, of a certain fund for depreciation; at the same
time declaring that it would not permit the capitalization of any
expenditures which did not actually increase the original value
of the plant.
The proceedings1 in the matter of the application of the
N. Y. Rys. Co. for authority to issue $2,600,000 of bonds for cars
and car barn equipment illustrate the position of this body with
reference to depreciation and capitalization of replacements.
This company proposed to purchase 175 new cars but the
intention was not to add 175 cars to its equipment but to replace
an old car with each new one purchased. The petitioners stated
that they should be allowed to capitalize the difference between
the cost of the new cars and the present value of the old. The
cost of replacements would thus be in part defrayed by capital
issues
.
The company attempted to justify its proposal in this
way. It was said that the newly acquired property had been
purchased at its present value and not at the original cost. The
company argue that the payment of interest on the income bonds
should not be held up, the inevitable result of paying for re-
placements out of earnings "In such a case", said the commissioner,
1. Ill, 1st IT.Y. P.S.C. 404.
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"If interest cannot be paid without capitalizing replacements, the
blame attaches to those who reorganized the company." In fact
the commission found this concern to be grossly overcapitalized
and that the difference between the cost of new cars and the
value of the old was highly exaggerated. But, granting the
capitalization and the ^ar value margin to be legitimate, the
above argument would apply to all replacement and maintenance
charges. Improvements would be paid for by the public and repairs
of all sorts might be capitalized with disastrous results
illustrated by the financial wrecks throughout Manhattan traction.
The commission then said, "Furthermore the courts have expressly
stated that the commission has no legal power to authorize the
issue of bonds for replacements and it is the duty of the
commission to determine the nature of the purposes of proposed
bond issues. 1 On the other hand since the amendment of the law
in 1910 expenditures upon the property made from income may
properly be capitalized. In 1912 2 the Erie was permitted to issue
#12,000,000 of bonds which amount had been spent upon improvements
out of income. Whether non revenue producing expenditures can be
legitimately capitalized is a knotty problem and the attitude of
the commission is naturally to restrict this growing tendency.
All of these questions of course are more or less
1.
2. I, 2nd N. Y. P.S.C. 238.
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related to specific cases and the practice varies from time to
time as well as from state to state.
A problem of much the same nature is presented when
bonds are issued at less than par. It has now become a well
be
recognized principle that bond discounts should/amortized before
the bonds come due. The Railroad Securities Commission in its
report three years ago reached the conclusion that "No limitation
should be placed upon the price at which bonds can be sold, but
any discount should be cancelled or amortized during the life
of the bonds, by the appropriation each year out of the annual
income or surplus accumulated after the issue of the bonds, of
not less than proportionate amount of the discount." It has been
the constant practice of the New York Commission^" to require the
difference between the cash proceeds of the bonds and their par
value to be treated as a bank discount or interest paid in
advance and it should be amortized during the pendency of the
obligation. It has been one of the most prominent rules of
Massachusetts 2 practice not to authorize stock issue at less than
2par. As an instance of the wide application which may be made of
the amortization device the case of the Kings County Electric
Light and Power Company may be cited. In its formation £400,000
of stock, par value, and $5,000 cash were exchanged for stock 2
of the Amsterdam Company amounting to $787,525. This latter
1. 1 st. I. Y. Ill, 153
2.
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corapany was practically defunct and had never paid any interest
or dividends. The only value it represented was that of security
from competition, an intangible asset which the commission
naturally would not allow to be capitalized. They ordered the
$405,000 to be written off or amortized at once so that the
amount of capitalization would be wiped out when the bonds came
due. On this point the Wisconsin Commission is similarly inclined
and rigidly holds to the principle of no capital increase unless
accompanied by an increase in the value of the plant, or equipment.
There are many refinements of this principle, one of which is the
capitalization of premiums on stock. This is well illustrated
in a case before the Massachusetts Commission. 1 The Boston and
Maine Railroad had purchased all of the capital stock of three
other rail companies at prices considerably above par. The Boston
and Maine had applied for authority to issue stock to pay for the
stock it had of these other roads. If the amount of this purchase
price were provided by an issue of stock of the Boston and Maine
at par, the result would be to increase largely the aggregate
outstanding capitalization of the Boston and Maine. It was
stated by the commission if these various lesser roads attempted
to capitalize the premium value of their capital stock it would
be clearly at variance with the general policy of the commonwealth
The fact that the increase capitalization is made through the
1. Mass. P.S.C. I, 18£.
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mediura of Boston and Maine Stock does not alter its essential
character so far as the public is concerned. These lines were at
the time leased and it was advanced by the commission that the
higher the rentals paid by the lessee, the Boston and Maine, the
higher would be the market value of the stocks regardless of the
financial results of their operation.
The necessary result of such capitalization of
premiums on stock is the transference of the dividend burden to
the public in the form of higher rates • If we look at the case
before us we will see that it is in fact one of consolidation.
Dividends will be paid upon the properties as a unit and the
smaller proportionate value of the Boston and Maine should be
equalized over the whole as well as the greater proportionate
value of the smaller lines equalized over the Boston and Maine.
However, the Massachusetts board approved the issue of the
Boston and Maine common shares sufficient to cover the market
value of the stock of the other lines. But special considera-
tions influenced their decision, notably the elimination of
certain fixed charges due to rentals on leased lines and that a
more equal distribution of dividends among all the stockholders
of the Boston and Maine was in the interest of the public.
Moreover the board was aware that this increase of capitaliza-
tion would be more than offset by decrease of capitalization
due to the purchase of other leased lines made at prices below
par. It was expressly given out at the time this decision was
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raade that it was not to be regarded as a precedent in the
determination of all similar questions thereafter.
On this point the ruling of the California Commission
is very instructive. In April 1913 the San Diego Consolidated
Gas and Electric Company petitioned for authority to issue
$314,800 of common stock to wipe out an indebtedness incurred
in construction and through improvements which were part of the
purposes for which $3,629,000 of par value bonds had been issued
at some time prior to this and which had netted only 91 and 95
in sale. The commission held that however legitimate the
expenditures the discount should be amortized over a period of
years out of current earnings, for according to the California
law neither bond nor stock discount can be capitalized. In the
same case it was laid down by the commission that a premium on
stock, of any nature, in the case of redemption premium on
bonds could not be capitalized. The commission would have been
very willing to grant the desired authority had the basis been
extension of plant, for its earnings were large and the concern
was in sound financial condition.
The chief result of this policy is the holding down
of capitalization and the enforcement of strict conservation
of the resources of public utilities since they must be available
when necessary, to pay off indebtedness arising from past
discount on stock premiums.
The refunding problem is closely akin to that of
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amortization and discount. The New York Commissions have in
various instances permitted the issue of new securities to take
the place of old ones, but only when a guarantee was given that"*"
the par value of the bonds should be substantially equalled by the
actual worth of the property. The California Commission has
p
treated this problem fully in several cases. They have stated
that the financial condition of a company should always be taken
into consideration before authorizing a refund issue, yet
they fully realize their duty to both the utility and its patrons
as well as the opportunity their approval extends to foist
securities upon the public. When the financial condition of a
petitioner is evidently insecure, provision may be made for a
stock levy to make up any deficit. Here we have in sharp conflict
two opposing theories namely that the past should be disregarded
and only the value of the property upon which the securities
are based should be taken into consideration, and on the other
hand, the somewhat retroactive and highly conservative policy
of closely restricting future bond issues until past deficiencies
have been made up out of earnings. In refunding cases the
commissions must guard the interests of investor, patron, and
utility, all of which are seemingly in conflict. When the case
involves a monopoly the situation may become grave for a community
1. Araer. Econ. Rev. Sept. 1914, 541.
2. I. Cal. R.R. Com. Rep. 535.
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and provision should be made for the guarantee of funds to make
necessary improvements. This ouestion has not yet been finally
solved to the satisfaction of any one.
The principle of the Massachusetts law is that no public
service securities shall be issued except for cash and at face
value. There is no doubt that this is a very excellent rule and
it is very difficult to practically enforce. Since the formation
of the new Public Service Commission in Massachusetts this policy
has relinquished some of its rigidity in cases where adequate
amortization provisions are inserted in the authorization
certificate. This is in accord with New York practice.^ I can
see no valid objection to the sale of bonds at less than par by a
company in good financial condition and especially if there is a
guarantee that the margin will be made up by a reserve fund.
This privilege may be the means of raising capital easier and the
enhanced value of the securities at a later time may be in the
nature of compensation for risks assumed. That this does have a
tendency to inflate capitalization is true and should be closely
restricted but hardly prohibited yet.
In financing reorganizations and consolidations many
difficult problems of a more or less recurrent nature have come
up to our state commissions and with regard to some of them
definite policies have been adopted by these bodies.
1. Amer. Econ. Rev. Sept. 1914, 555.
II, 1st. N. Y. P.S.C. 412-414.
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At the time of the reorganization of the Third Avenue
Railroad Company a strange but important issue was sharply raised
as to whether non-existing property should be capitalized. The
newly formed company sought permission to capitalize not only the
value of the properties taken over but also the cost of the horse
car lines and cable roads which had long since disappeared. These
two items represented about $2,800,000 and the question up to the
commission was; should the new company be allowed to issue
securities that do not represent any property to be acquired or
any necessary expenses connected with such property. Following
the general principles laid down by the commission thus far, there
was only one course open, i.e. refusal to grant the desired
authority. Obviously it would be wrong for the company to have
the right to demand from the public returns upon a non-existent
predecessor which should have kept its capital investment intact
from its income.
In authorizing the capitalization of many public
utility companies, commissions have been called upon to decide
the extent to which development charges and construction expenses
should be represented by securities. It is quite generally
admitted by commissions that interest and taxes during construction
and organization expenses should be reckoned in a fair valuation
of the properties about to be capitalized. There are many
1. II, 1st N. Y. P.S.C. 405
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delicate questions raised in the course of the solution of these
problems; some of which were clearly outlined in the plan of
reorganization of the Third Avenue Company. 1
It was the theory of the company that interest and
taxes should be included in the valuation up until the company
could earn a certain surplus above expenses and pay a reasonable
dividend to the stockholders. This was tantamount to saying
that the longer a company is unable to earn dividends the greater
is its value, Furthermore this would be violating the best
principles of sound finance by practically issuing stock dividends
since they were seeking to capitalize unearned dividends. This
commission (the 1st Dist. N.Y.) could not subscribe to this view
but expressed itself as willing to concede interest during
construction, taxes, and development expenses, as properly entitled
to full weight in a valuation and a fair basis for the issue of
securities. But these items were to be counted only up to the
time when actual operation began. In this matter New York has
been comparativelyliberal, thus facilitating initial steps in
construction of necessary service companies. The New Jersey
Commission has been even more liberal than that of New York.
In the Third Avenue case the petitioners claimed the
value of the property to be $60, 000, 000. and reached this conclu-
sion after capitalizing at four per cent the estimated net
1. II, 1st N.Y. P.S.C. 405.
2. Quar. Jour. Econ. Sept. 1914, 550.
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earnings of $2,400,000. not considering the intrinsic worth of
the physical property. It was brought out in the testimony taken
that through the medium of fares, earnings were to bear a
direct relation to the actual value and the capitalization was
to be determined by earnings. This would naturally be a shifting
basis, one standard being used for rate making and another for
capitalization. It might develop at a later period that fares
could be lowered and all operating charges still be paid leaving
a generous return upon the actual value of the property, but
that such lower fares would not yield enough to pay interest
and dividends upon the outstanding capital issues since rates are
or
based, not upon capital, but upon physical/structural value.
Clearly, in such cases, the commissions cannot approve an issue
of bonds except when they believe them to represent actual
property and that the chances are strong that the interest will
be paid. Capitalization based upon expectations or mere estimated
earnings will inevitably lead to bad results and the frequent
practice of this plan in the past but increases the necessity for
close supervision of such issues.
The capitalization of promoters charges presents a
similar problem and it is handled differently by the several state
boards. The California body is inclined to admit this item as
reasonably chargeable to capital account while the Massachusetts
Commission is firmly opposed to this policy. The New York1
practice has been to admit the cost of promotion as a develop-
1. II, 1st N.Y. P.S.C. 412.

-32-
ment expense where it is held within reasonable limits and can be
guaranteed as bona fide.
In some applications before commissions certain intangi-
bles such as going value, good will, and "words of commendation",
have been urged as legitimate grounds for capital issues. These
are vague and hardly to be measured in any terms of money,
although doubtless of great value in many cases. On the other
hand a street car company possessing a virtual monopoly cannot be
said to be enjoying its prosperity through any "good will".
There are various methods of computing the value of these in-
tangible assets and none can be considered perfect or even
realiable. Cases of this nature must be decided on their own
merits for there are no practicable working standards by which
to test such qualities. Many items which enter into the estimates
of the going value figure call for expenditures from year to year
and are hence chargeable to operating expenses.
Franchises, though of incalculable value to public
service companies are not subject to representation in the
capital account unless some consideration therefor has been paid
into the treasury of some political unit. The value of franchises
is always a question of supreme importance when the sale of a
utility to a municipality is contemplated. But a discussion of
that phase of the problem is not pertinent here.
Thusfar we have dealt with problems of capital control
in general. Many of them are peculiar to corporate reorganization
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and consolidations. The most important work in reorganization and
consolidation proceedings has been done by the New York commissions.
These boards have not attempted, as has that of Texas, to undo
all financial misdeeds at one fell stroke but they have followed
a salutary corrective policy so far as it has been practicable
and consonant with the best public interests. An excellent
illustration of their work is offerred in the Third Avenue
Reorganization. This companies securities were not unduly sealed
down and the interests of both security holders and patrons were
adequately consulted. With strict supervision it became possible
to allow the corporation fairly wide latitude in rehabilitating
its plant in accord with transportation needs and still offer
every reasonable assurance that its securities would default
neither in interest nor principal.
The issue of securities in connection with consolidations
naturally calls for separate treatment. The laws of some states,
Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York for example require that
the aggregate capital of consolidated companies shall not exceed
the sum of the stocks and debt of the consolidating units. It
probably appears that it would be in the public interest for a
strong concern with low operating costs to absorb a weak and
inefficient competitor, but the purchase price is really of vital
importance to all concerned. The Second District Commission of
New York in granting authority to issue securities requires the
amortization of the difference between the value of the acquired
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property and the price paid in regard to consolidations effected
prior to the assumption of securities control. 1 Strong companies
often try to water the stock by the purchase of subsidiaries at
exorbitatn prices. This was well illustrated in the Boston and
Maine cases2 before the Massachusetts Commission and in the
Delaware and Kudson case3 in 1908 before the End Dist. Com. of
N. Y. This road applied for authority to issue bonds to take up
notes representing the acquisition of the Hudson Valley Railway
and certain coal properties. The Commission held that the value
claimed for the purchased securities was fictitious. This ruling
however was not enforced the courts having later decided the
commission to have acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.
CHAPTER III.
Up to this point we have examined certain of the laws
and principles according to which securities control is exercised.
With all of its admirable development in the last few
years no one can say that this type of control is flawless as
pointed out in the Kadley Securities Commission report there is
one common and fundamental fault of state regulatory policies.
This is the failure to recognize the full distinction between
stocks and bonds. Now there is no uncertainty as to the nature
of a bond. It is a note made by a corporation, a promise to
pay a specified sum of money on a certain date at a certain rate
of interest. The obligation and value are definite and are
1. Amer. Econ. Rev. Sept. 1914, 347.
2. I, Mass. P.S.C. 341.
3. Amer. Econ. Rev. Sept. 1914, 347.
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limited by the terms of the instrument. But a share of stock
is a different thing. It represents a share in property owner-
ship and states that a certain amount of money has been paid into
the company's treasury. But the Commissions too often neglect
to take into account the fact that the chief basis for the value
of the stock lies in the share of ownership it represents. There
is no obligation to pay and its value varies with the prosperity
of the enterprise, with the risks assumed by the investor and
the profits accruing to his interests. To be sure wild cat
promotion schemes should be stamped out and over-credulous money-
owners should be protected, but stock should not be looked upon
as a claim against the community. This tendency has been marked
in several states, especially with respect to the stock of railway
corporations. Nearly all states require railroad stock issued to
be paid in full at par value. West Virginia alone allows the
issue of this class of stock at less than par. The error in this
policy is that it places too much emphasis on keeping down the
nominal amount of the stock and not enough on getting the amount
of capital needed to supply adequate service. In the past
evasions of this law were numerous and devious but with the
surveillance of the commissions it is practically impossible now.
As governmental control over our economic life is
extended there goes with it pari passu, an agitation for uniformity
and for the assumption of more far reaching powers by the federal
government. In respect to the control of railroad issues much
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haa been said concerning the ineffectiveness of the state
administration and much in favor of the substitution of federal
regulation. A few years ago the Railroad Securities Commission
reported that it was of the opinion that the time was not yet
ripe for the assumption of this power by the federal government.
It is perfectly true that the industrial needs of our
country are not everywhere the same and the problems of the
undeveloped regions differ widely from those of the older sections
of the nation. In the opinion of many writers enforced federal
control of railway securities might, in attempting to adhere to
a seemingly fair standard, discriminate against localities and
independent companies which are less able to secure financial
support. These objections however are losing force as economic
development of outlying territory approaches more nearly to a
general level, but at present they might militate strongly against
the services of the immediate adoption of federal control.
Yet upon looking closely into recent developments in the
matter of control of railway securities we may easily conclude
that federal control is not far distant, referring here of course
only to interstate roads. We are bound to recognize that there
are many conflicts of jurisdiction relating to construction,
operation, and financing of railways which in the words used in
the Railroad Securities Commission Report "May more and more
embarrass interstate commerce and necessitate a larger degree of
federal control, or even result in federal incorporation". I
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think we may safely say that the increase of commission activity
affecting interstate transportation companies will only hasten
federal control of financing. The growing complexity of the
intercorporate relations of our great railways is chiefly
responsible for this condition. Practically all roads extend
through several states and are involved with other companies in
various ways. The recent collapse of the New Haven, the Hock
Island troubles, and the wrecking of the Alton have indeed shown
the advisability of some central administrative authority which
the states cannot supply with any degree of efficiency. For
example, after the failure of the Wabash there were six different
state commissions concerned with its reorganization. The
approval of each was necessary before any plans could be
consummated and the orders of each had to be obeyed. In this
connection another evil arises from the divided control, that of
dissimilar bases for capitalization since the federal government
has the rate regulative power and the state supervision over the
issuance of securities.
A recent case for the Illinois Public Utilities1Commission
illustrates the possibilities involved in this jurisdictional
conflict. The Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway was
authorized to issue 130,000,000 of bonds, the larger part of the
proceeds being intended for furthering construction and making
improvements in Iowa, V/isconsin, Minnesota, and South Dakota. 1
1. 1st Rep. 111. Pub. Ut. Com. 1914.
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It follows that a company may be compelled to secure the approval
of several state commissions for the issue of securities
representing property in only two or more states. Some states,
Missouri for example, give their commissions power to pass upon
the validity of corporate issues of foreign companies upon
property within those states. But we cannot expect the state
commissions to withdraw from the field until Congress has made
privisions for a more extensive exercise of authority by the
Interstate Commerce Commission.
Of the relation of state control to municipalities
little need be said. In some states municipalities have retained
large measures of control but they have been more often
surrendered to the states. The problems presented in the
regulation of the service companies of our great cities are peculi-
ar and call for special training. New York has met this difficulty
by providing a separate state commission for Hew York City alone.
This body has been very successful and is now indispensable.
In 1913 a bill was introduced in the Illinois legislature creat-
ing a separate commission for Chicago but it failed to pass. At
present the people of Chicago are clamoring for a municipal
commission in furtherance of the "Howe Rule" idea.
In seeking to improve our methods and machinery of
governmental control of economic activity it is of first
importance to discover what are the effects of agencies we now
have at our disposal. In many localities the instruments for
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the control of capitalization are but newly instituted and 80
far the effects are difficult to discern. In many states no
important cases have come up and no decisions of far-reaching
consequences have been handed down. We can however profitably
examine affairs in New York, Massachusetts, and Texas and
generalize to a certain extent our discoveries there.
One of the primary purposes of this regulative legisla-
tion is the protection of investors. To what extent has this
purpose been fulfilled? We have seen that state commissioners
will not guarantee to an investor that he will receive a return
upon his investment. The most they can do is to satisfy them-
selves of the validity of the security upon which capital issues
are permitted. Now it is a natural consequence that the stamp
of approval of a state commission will render the sale of
securities much easier, but it does not, on the other hand,
eliminate the risk of which the investor must still be cautious.
It is of more concern to an investor that his principal be
secure than that he reap a return in the form of dividends or
interest. Eence it cannot be doubted that with a states sanction
behind an issue, the investor is sure to feel that his money is
safely placed in such securities.
If we examine the reorganization of the Third Avenue
Company, the Interborough Rapid Transit and other similar
companies who sought to issue wholesale, refunding obligations,
bonds based upon probable or estimated income, to defray
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freudulent development expenses we can reasonably conclude that
being refused the desired authority, state control has been and
will continue to be of great protection to investors* interests.
We have no reason to believe that the floating of these issues
would have not been a comparatively easy matter had there been
no governmental sanction necessary. As it was the public was
defended from carrying the burden of worthless securities and
when issues were made by these corporations the commission's
approval signified that they were based not upon more prospects
but upon real property values.
One inevitable result of the establishment of this form
of regulation is to diminish the activity of promoters. These
agents have been usually connected with enterprises of the more
speculative nature and have sought large profits in uncertain
investments. Now, with enforced publicity of accounts and
reports and public hearings by commissions, the large field of
public utility enterprise is apt to need the services of promoter
no longer. This class of financiers assume large risks and
responsibilities in the hope of obtaining commensurate returns
and they quite naturally seek to avoid all restrictions. Yet
these men have been very useful in the past and their enforced
inactivity may mean that capital will, during the interval of
adjustment, flow less readily with public service undertakings.
The long run effect however may be reasonably expected to
operate in the other direction and the greater security offered
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by public supervision should cause an increased willingness on
the part of investors to purchase this class of securities.
Bearing a close relation to the added protection to
investors and the effect on the volume of investments is the
effect this control will have upon the service itself, maintenance,
development, and charges.
The oarrer of the New Haven is instructive enough on
this point. From 1903 to 1912 the outstanding securities of
this road increased from $95,000,000 to $417,000,000 although
the operated milage increased only 50 miles. ^ Nowhere have we
an example of more reckless disregard for public and investors, or
of a more complete breakdown in service. When the capitalization
has become so large that it takes so much from the gross earnings
that An insufficient amount is left for operation and maintenance
and the plant is in such a condition as to preclude the
possibility of attracting further capital for necessary improve-
ments and replacements, it is high time for the intervention of
public authority on behalf of the community's welfare.
Many communities depend upon monopolies and it is
essential that these be controlled in their most vital relations.
Capitalization is certainly one of these because of its direct
bearing upon services and charges. The holding-down of capital
issues to a parity with actual worth will insure most companies
1. Eept. R.R. Com. to Gov, 1912.

-42-
of an easy flotation in the future of any proposed issue for
lawful purposes, and at the same time insure to the public
improvements which will satisfy its legitimate needs. This has
been a vexatious problem and some stateB have dealt with it in
a retroactive manner. Massachusetts and Texas have usually
refused an increase of capitalization to companies which were
already overcapitalized. The commissions of these two states
compel petitioners to divert from their incomes an amount
sufficient to equalize the deficiency between value and outstand-
ing capitalization before more capital issues can be made. The
practice of these two states, however, commendable morally, seems
to have been too rigid and to have sought to correct all past
errors at once."1" The results of the application of the Texas
law have been very unsatisfactory from a commercial and economic
standpoint. Between 1892 and 1906 the capitalization of the
Houston and Texas Central decreased $1,000,000 while its mileage
increased from 507 to 694 miles, being a drop in per-mile
capitalization of from $50,900 to $35,700. For the whole state,
from 1894 to 1906 the mileage increased 12,058 miles and the per-
mile capitalization declined from $40,802 to $51,530. This is
an anomalous condition but is due to the Texas policy of refusing
to permit any obligations to be refunded and to the insistence
that capitalization shall be brought into strict accord with
1. Amer. Econ. Rev. Sept. 1914, 552.
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the actual investment.
It cannot be denied that one effect of this very
restrictive Texas law has been to retard developments and
discourage improvements. On the Texas railroads, the substitution
of heavy rails for light ones, the replacement of wooden
structures with steel, the reduction of grades, and the
improvement of stations has progressed at a snail's pace when
we compare them with the advance made in other states. Little
or no net earnings have remained on the roads of this state and
most of them have reported deficits. Under such circumstances
new capital has had to be raised by the use of collateral trust
bonds issued upon the good credit of parent roads outside the
state. After comparing the results of this practice with
conditions in New York it seems certain that the requirements of
the Texas statutes are too exacting and that the commission should
be given more descretionary power in authorizing security issues.
In a state so peculiarly situated as is Texas and in so
much need of better and more extensive transporation facilities
it would appear that some action should be taken soon to change
the existing order of things and make railway investment in
that state more desirable as well as safe. It is conceded that
the risks attendant upon the launching of any new enterprise
must be compensated in some way - often by stock discounts - and
1. Amer. Econ. Rev. Sept. 1914, 558.
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a8 risks are still heavy upon the construction of railroads in
many of our states, laws should be so framed that capital will
not be frightened away but attracted to their communities.
Fortunately, those western states which have recently enacted
laws providing securities control have shown a marked tendency
to realize this possibility and have taken into account the fact
that they will need extensions of service facilities from time
to time.
In exercising supervision over the issuance of securities
the connection between capitalization and rates may become a vital
one. It is only natural that security holders will exert
pressure to secure dividends and interest and the managements of
corporations usually endeavor to satisfy their demands. For this
purpose earnings that should be set aside for repairs or
deposited in depreciation reserves are often diverted into
improper channels leading to poor service and eventually result-
ing in recourse to capital issues to provide for renewals and
replacement of equipment. In examining the policies of leading
commissions we saw that such courses are no longer permitted and
adequate provision must be made for maintenance of service plants
on a standard basis. The examples of abuses of this nature have
been only too numerous in the past. Utilities falling into
unsound financial conditions have resorted to higher rates in
order to maintain the dividend rate or to raise it in order to
find an easier sale for their securities. The proneness to do
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this is always more marked in overcapitalized companies than in
those of a more conservative capitalization, furthermore it is
well known that rates for services bear some relation to the
interest rate although it may be an undeterminate one, and the
interest rate is in a large measure affected by the risks
attendant upon the particular enterprise. One result of the
regulation of securities issue is to reduce risks or to create
the impression that public utility concerns are less uncertain.
Hence there may be a decrease in the interest rate necessary in
these industries, and following the proposition to its logical
conclusion as far as interest charges affect rates, so far will
these be lowered. But of course such a complication of causes
affect rates that we are unable to ascribe any definite weight to
this factor of lowered interest rates. We can at best indicate
the tendency which may be entirely counteracted by other factors.
It is held by commissions in general that rates should be no
higher than to yield a reasonable and adequate return upon the
property used and if more than this is obtained the rates1 are
unreasonable. Now a commission, after determining the value of
a property will be bound to authorize an issue equivalent thereto
and is morally obliged to permit a rate high enough to yield the
adequate return. Of course here the connection between capitali-
zation and rates is merely indidental, the vital relation
1. Gal. R.R. Com. Rep. 216.
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existing between valuation and rates. As a matter of fact
valuation figures and total outstanding capitalization rarely
agree except in companies formed in late years when commission
supervision has become comprehensive in its scope.
CHAPTER IV.
If state regulation of the issue of securities has
helped to obliterate existing overcapitalization and prevents it
at present thus securing for the public better service and lower
rates it is reasonable to assume, though difficult to prove,
that it has enabled capital to be more effectively used. This
may not be an avowed purpose of securities control but it is a
highly desirable by-product and one which will doubtless be of
greater value with further operation. The commissions earnestly
endeavor to restrict the amount of invested capital to the
satisfaction of the legitimate needs of commerce, and in this
field capital will surely not be unnecessarily invested.
In so far as we have gone the results of securities
regulation have been highly beneficial and we may expect
healthier financial situations to prevail in the future as, one
by one, the entanglements of the past are unravelled and the day
of disastrous reorganizations passes. The financial evils
resulting from overcapitalization it appears, will be eradicated
and extensive control of all branches of public service will
apparently harmonize the interests of both the public and the
corporation. Texas it is true, has been too exacting in her
laws and conditions in that state are anything but desirable. A
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retarded development of the transportation system seems
directly chargeable to the too inflexible restriction placed
upon the issue of stocks and bonds. But Texas is not to be
regarded as typical and one of the chief values of its activities
lies in the lessons its experience holds out for our future
guidance. Many of the difficulties of the present administra-
tion of these laws will no doubt be smoothed out in the process
of evolution from an experimental to standardized stage; and
when the proper time comes an easy transition from state to
federal control may be effected with regard to corporations
doing interstate business. Experience has already demonstrated
the wisdom or the folly of many principles applied to securities
control and we see clearly that there is a middle ground between
too severe restriction and too great freedom.
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